This paper estimates the importance of workers' outside options in wage determination. In models of search and bargaining, a worker's wage is determined by the marginal product of labour and by a weighted average of wages in alternate jobs. Thus, the nature of the wage equation makes it di cult to isolate changes in workers' outside options that are independent from changes in the marginal product of labour. This paper builds on the predictions of a search and bargaining model with multiple cities, industries and occupations to propose novel identification strategies. Using a unique administrative panel database for Germany, the study exploits di↵erences in both the employment composition across cities and in job-specific skill transferability as sources of variation for identification. The main finding of the paper is that a 10% increase in the outside options of a worker generates a 7% wage increase. JEL classification numbers: J30, J31, J60, J62.
Introduction
It is increasingly accepted that labour markets are not perfectly competitive and that frictions of various kinds generate rents to the employment relationship for both workers and employers. These frictions imply that wages depart from the marginal product of labour and partly reflect workers' outside options. In the particular case of search and bargaining models, wages are determined by both the marginal product of labour and a weighted average of wages in alternate jobs. 1 Since an industry-specific shock will be passed through into wages via two channels (the marginal product and workers' outside options), comparative statics of search and bargaining and perfect competition models will di↵er. Yet, despite these di↵erences, the marginal product hypothesis remains the benchmark for wage formation and only few empirical attempts have examined the relevance of workers' outside options for wage formation. The goal of this paper is to propose a strategy to examine whether wages conform to the predictions of search and bargaining theory and test the relevance of this strategy using an administrative panel database on workers in Germany.
A key di culty in identifying search and bargaining mechanisms is that a worker's marginal product is not directly observable. The main contribution of the paper is to show that it is possible to use observational data to separate the respective e↵ects of outside options from those of unobserved productivity. In particular, the paper argues that if one is willing to place some restrictions on the production function, a triple di↵erence estimation combined with an instrumental variable strategy can correct observed wage movements for changes in the marginal product of labour and what is left can be interpreted as search and bargaining e↵ects.
The most recent approach to identifying search and bargaining mechanisms has been suggested by Beaudry et al. (2012) . The authors propose a multi-city multi-sector model of search and bargaining in which a worker's outside option is formed by all the industrial wages of the city in which the worker lives. The authors show that in such a framework, a worker's outside option can be written as a weighted average of industrial wages, where the weights are given by the corresponding industrial employment as a share of city employment. Thus, a direct implication of the proposed model is that, conditional on productivity, a city with a larger proportion of high-paying industries benefits from higher wages in all its industries.
The authors argue that variation "within industry across cities" can be used to identify the e↵ect of workers' outside options on industry-city wages. Consider an environment with 2 cities (A and B) and 2 industries (manufacturing and natural resources). In this environment, the natural resources sector is located in city A only. Imagine that for some exogenous reason, the price of natural resources goes up. Assume that following that increase, wages go up in both sectors and both cities but that, for simplicity, no labour movements are observed across sectors. Further assume that shifts in productivity in the manufacturing sector are identical in both cities. Since the natural resources sector is only located in city A and since no labour movements are observed, workers' outside options remain identical in city B and the increase in wages in the manufacturing sector in city B can be entirely attributed to a shift in productivity (possibly due to the fact that the manufacturing sector works to process natural resources). In city A, however, the increase in wages observed in the manufacturing sector reflects both an improvement in workers' outside options and a shift in productivity. In this particular environment, the identification strategy proposed by Beaudry et al. (2012) consists in taking the di↵erence between periodical changes in wages in the manufacturing sector in city A and those observed in city B, and attributing the residual wage variation to changes in workers' outside options in city A. Beaudry et al. (2012) make an important step towards identifying search and bargaining e↵ects.
However, their approach has two limitations which this paper attempts to address. First, the authors assume a technology in which factors are perfect substitutes. Since this assumption implies constant marginal product of labour within an industry and city, it is unclear whether independent e↵ects of workers' outside options are also identified when technology is of a di↵erent form. This study adopts a more flexible formulation of the production function and discusses the conditions under which the restrictions placed on technology do not allow for a separate identification of the e↵ects of workers' outside options.
Second, the authors implicitly assume that workers are identically mobile across any two pairs of occupation-industry (hereafter 'job') cells. A consequence of this assumption is that measured outside options are identical for all workers of the same city. Imagine for instance that the manufacturing sector employs both white and blue collar workers but that the natural resources sector only uses blue collar workers. The Beaudry et al. (2012) 's assumption implies that white and blue collars in the manufacturing sector in city A have the same outside options and the same probability of being employed in the natural resources industry, even if the latter only employs blue collar workers. However, one may think that the ability to transfer skills across jobs a↵ects whether and how wages o↵ered in other jobs enter the measure of outside options. This paper recognizes that workers potentially face heterogeneous barriers to mobility and explores the importance of the treatment of mobility across occupations and industries for wage formation.
To implement these changes, this paper builds on Beaudry et al. (2012) 's model and adapts it to allow for multiple occupations and di↵erences in occupation-industry-specific skill transferability.
In this framework, the outside options of a worker are given by a weighted average of the wages in all jobs of the city in which the worker lives. The most important di↵erence with Beaudry et al. (2012) is that the weights are represented by transition probabilities between the job currently occupied and the alternate jobs in which the worker could potentially be hired. These transition probabilities reflect the idea that the importance of a job in a worker's outside options depends not only on the relative number of vacancies available in that job but also on the ability of a worker to actually perform the job. Since these weights depend on the job that the worker is currently employed in, workers' outside options di↵er across jobs in the same industry and city.
The treatment of mobility across jobs plays an important role for the identification strategy. To see why, consider the previous example but assume that following the increase in the price of natural resources, city A and B experience di↵erential shifts in productivity in the manufacturing sector.
Under Beaudry et al. (2012) 's approach using variation "within industry across cities", all of the di↵erential in wage growth in the manufacturing sector between the two cities would be attributed to search and bargaining e↵ects, thus e↵ectively ignoring that changes in the value of the marginal product of labour within industry may di↵er across cities. The identification strategy proposed in this paper can deal with this issue by exploiting di↵erences in workers' outside options within an industry and city. In particular, identification can be achieved using a triple di↵erence estimation based on variation "within industry-city across jobs" and "within job across cities". In this example, the triple di↵erence consists in first, taking the di↵erence between changes in wages for blue collar workers in the manufacturing sector in city A and the equivalent wage variation for white collar workers, and second, calculating the di↵erence between that change and its particular counterpart in city B. The first di↵erence removes changes in productivity common to all occupations within an industry and city, and the second one eliminates job-specific shifts in productivity.
This paper proposes to apply the logic of this example to an environment with multiple jobs and multiple cities, and to the more realistic situation in which employment moves unconstrainedly.
However, when employment moves unconstrainedly, the triple di↵erence estimation has to be combined with an instrumental variable strategy. In fact, there may be an endogeneity problem because changes in productivity may a↵ect the employment composition in a city which, in turn, a↵ects the weights used to calculate workers' outside options. Hence, the triple di↵erence by itself may not be enough to identify independent e↵ects of workers' outside options. The paper uses Bartik-style instruments to isolate changes in workers' outside options that are uncorrelated with labour movements. These instruments are similar to those used by Beaudry et al. (2012) and predict workers' outside options by combining national job wage premia with the local structure of employment that would prevail if job-city employment had grown according to the national trend. The paper shows that these instruments are valid if shocks to comparative advantages are uncorrelated with past job-city-specific comparative advantages.
The empirical strategy is implemented using an administrative panel database on workers in Germany provided by the employment statistics of the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) for the period 1975-2001. This paper finds that while the treatment of mobility is an important issue, placing restrictions on the technology does not appear to be an important source of bias.
Overall, results suggest that job-city wages conform to the predictions of search and bargaining theory. The wage spillover e↵ects from a shift in workers' outside options are strong and consistent over a wide range of sensitivity checks: specifically, a 10% increase in workers' outside options generates a 7% wage increase. 2 Results from a variance decomposition suggest that a framework that ignores search and bargaining e↵ects would explain on average 11.5% of the cross-sectional variance in city wage growth, while a model that accounts for the e↵ects of workers' outside options is capable of explaining a much larger fraction of the variance. This fraction amounts to 18.9% in the case of constant mobility and increases to 68.8% in a model that incorporates di↵erences in job-specific skill transferability, suggesting that the framework of this paper may also be helpful for understanding the sources of the rise in wage inequalities that has been observed over the past 25 years in Germany.
Using a similar database, Card et al. (2013) provide descriptive evidence of the role of establish-2 Imagine, for instance, that the only option a secretary in the tertiary sector has access to is working in the car industry. This results means that a 10% wage increase for secretaries in the car industry will generate a 7% wage increase for secretaries in the tertiary sector. ment, worker and match-specific components in explaining the rise in wage inequality. The authors find that a considerable fraction of the rise in inequality is due to rising variation in the wage premia that are o↵ered by di↵erent employers. In this paper, search and bargaining mechanisms create wage disparities across employers for workers with otherwise similar characteristics and imply that the rise in workplace heterogeneity may have been caused by an increase in the dispersion of workers' outside options. Therefore, this paper provides a theory of wages consistent with Card et al. (2013) 's findings and o↵ers a potential explanation of the source of rising workplace heterogeneity that di↵ers from traditional explanations based on institutional or supply and demand factors. This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses how identification can be achieved. The empirical setting is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents results. In Section 6, the paper quantifies the importance of changes in workers' outside options in explaining the cross-sectional variance in city wage growth. The last section concludes.
Model
This section generalises Beaudry et al.'s (2012) multi-city, multi-sector model of search and bargaining to a framework with occupational and sectoral mobility.
Setup
Consider an environment with one final good Y , assembled from the economy-wide output of I industries, as given by
, where < 1, a i is a parameter reflecting aggregate demand for the industrial good i and Z i denotes the economy-wide output of industry i. The price of the final good is normalised to one.
The economy is segmented into C local labour markets, hereafter cities, indexed by c. Each city is populated by L c individuals who are either employed or unemployed. The economy-wide output Z i is given by the sum of Y ic , the output produced in each city. The price of the industrial good i in city c is p ic .
For clarity, production involves labour only and uses Q occupations indexed by q. The paper starts without explicitly specifying a functional form for technology and discusses later on the implications of placing restrictions on the production function. In what follows, an occupationindustry cell is referred to as a job and indexed by j, i.e. j = (q, i). S denotes the set of job and since each industry uses Q occupations, the cardinality of S is Q ⇥ I.
The number of firms and aggregate employment in an industry and a city are endogenously determined by a free entry condition within a frameworkà la Fonseca et al. (2001) . In this framework, an individual receives the option of creating a firm in industry i and city c with probability ⌦ ic . Upon learning ⌦ ic , the individual finds out n, the amount of labour he or she can manage, where n ⇠ G(n). Within an industry and a city, di↵erences in entrepreneurial ability to manage jobs are the only source of firm heterogeneity. Finally, to enter the production market, he or she faces a constant start-up cost, denoted by K. Free entry implies that individuals with expected payo↵s larger than the fixed entry cost K become entrepreneurs.
The labour market considered is characterised by search and matching frictions. For simplicity, assume that workers can move within but not across cities. Appendix C of the Supplementary
Material discusses the implications of workers' mobility across cities and demonstrates that the results are robust to an extension allowing for this type of mobility. For the majority of the analysis, this paper focuses on random search and ignores resignations as well as on-the-job search. However, implications of directed search across occupations as well as on-the-job search are discussed in Appendix D and K-3 of the Supplementary Material, respectively. Once matches are made workers and firms bargain over the wage rate, through Nash bargaining in a complete information context.
Layo↵s occur at an exogenous rate, denoted by .
The model is couched in continuous time. Workers and firms live forever, discount the future at an exogenous rate ⇢ and are risk neutral. Workers seek to maximise the expected discounted sum of future utility flows, and firms are profit maximisers. Let ER c denote the employment rate in city c, w jc be the wage in job j and city c and ⌘ jc denote employment in job j and city c as a share of city c employment. The steady state is characterised by values of ER c , w jc and ⌘ jc . Prices adjust such that markets for industrial goods clear and react to shifts in the demand for industrial goods, as captured by a i .
Search and matching
In each city, there is a pool U c of unemployed workers drawing job o↵ers from the entire local labour market. Workers face barriers to mobility and their appointment to a particular job depends on three components: labour market frictions (as captured by the matching function), vacancies in that particular job and on the job performed prior to unemployment.
The rate at which unemployed workers meet any vacancy is governed by a city-specific matching and is increasing in both arguments. These features imply that ⌘ jc , the proportion of employment in each job, equals the proportion of existing positions (filled and unfilled) in job j and city c. That
, where J jc denotes the total number of existing positions in job j and city c. In steady state, the number of positions that are destroyed equals the number of matches such that
where is the coe cient of the Cobb-Douglas matching function.
Given the matching function, the probability that an unemployed worker meets any vacancy is given by c =
Mc
Lc Nc , or in steady state, c = ERc 1 ERc . Then, the probability that the vacancy is from a particular job type is determined by ⌘ jc , the proportion of employment accounted for by that type in the local economy. Finally, whether workers actually fulfil the match is based on their ability to transfer skills across jobs. Workers' skill transferability from job j to k is captured by the measure ' k|j 2 [0, 1], where k indexes the destination job cell. This measure is zero if the cost of transfering skills between two jobs is prohibitive, and one if workers are perfectly mobile. Combining employment shares together with the skill transferability measure, one obtains the probability that a worker previously employed in j (e.g. as a secretary in the automobile industry) finds a job in k (e.g. as a legal assistant in the tertiary sector) in city c. This transition probability is given by
where µ denotes the probability that a worker previously employed in j is re-employed in the same occupation and industry and
The term kc|j can be interpreted as a measure of relative mobility. In the following 3x2 example, LT A|SC reflects the ease with which a secretary in the car industry transfers skills to a legal assistant job in the tertiary sector, relative to moving to any other job in city A.
The transition probability kc|j sums to 1 because
When workers are homogeneous and thus identically mobile across jobs (i.e. when ' k|j = '), the (conditional) probability of finding a job equals the proportion of vacancies for that particular job ( kc|j = ⌘ kc ). Finally, the probability that a firm fills a vacancy is given by c =
Jc Nc . In steady state, this probability is given by c =
Wage determination
Let V f jc (n) and V v jc (n) be the discounted value to a firm with managerial ability n of a filled position and a vacancy in job j and city c, respectively, and the di↵erence between both values be the match surplus for the firm. Let U e jc (n) and U u jc (n) be the discounted value to a worker (in a firm with managerial ability n) of being employed and unemployed in job j and city c, respectively, and the di↵erence between both values be the match surplus for the worker. Wages are set by Nash bargaining with disagreement points V v jc (n) and U u jc (n) for firms and workers, respectively
where  is the relative bargaining power of firms and workers. To understand the nature of the wage equation, it is useful to write down the Bellman equations.
Step-by-step details on how the following equations are derived can be found in Appendix A of the Supplementary Material.
Let V MP L jc (n) be the value of the marginal product of labour in job j, city c and in a firm with managerial ability n. If a position is filled, it generates a flow of profits of
where w jc (n) is the wage in job j, city c and firm with managerial ability n. The probability of a worker being laid o↵ in the subsequent period and the position becoming vacant is . Thus, the discounted value to a firm of a filled position is given by
The probability of the vacancy being filled in the following period is c . 4 Hence, the discounted value to a firm of a vacancy is
Combining equations (3) and (4), the match surplus for the firm can be written as
An employed worker in job j, city c and firm with managerial ability n receives the wage w jc (n) and is laid o↵ with probability in the next period. 5 Therefore, the discounted value to a worker of being employed is
The probability of an unemployed worker previously employed in jc being matched to job k in city c is c kc|j . The probability of him or her remaining unemployed in the coming period is (1 c ). Thus, the discounted value of being unemployed is given by
where U e kc is the average discounted utility of employment in job k and city c, averaged over all firms that operate in city c. This paper assumes that if an unemployed worker is matched to a particular job, then he or she develops skills which are identical to those of his co-workers, which means that the measures of relative mobility satisfy k 0 c|k kc|j = k 0 c|j . This assumption implies that the summation term can be rewritten as follows
where w kc is the wage o↵ered in job k and city c, averaged over all firms that operate in city c.
Combining equations (6), (7) and (8), the match surplus for a worker is given by
The match surplus for a worker is a decreasing function of workers' outside options in other jobs of the city's economy. For example, if the probability to be matched to high-wage jobs increases (either because of a greater concentration of employment in high-wage jobs or because the mobility cost to access high-wage jobs decreases), then the value of a match in job j relative to unemployment decreases.
Substituting the expressions (5) and (9) into (2), and solving for the wage o↵ered in a firm with managerial ability n, one obtains
and 2c are functions of three exogeneous parameters: the discount rate ⇢, the rate at which layo↵s occur and , the relative bargaining position of workers and firms. 1c and 2c also depend on the local employment rate ER c , as captured by c , the probability that an unemployed worker meets any vacancy, and by c , the probability that a firm fills a vacancy in city c.
Averaging (10) over all firms which operate in the market in city c, one obtains the following expression for the wage in job j and city c,
where V MP L jc is the value of the marginal product of labour in job j and city c. In order to avoid estimating a tautological relationship, the wage in job j and city c can be expressed as a function of wages in alternate jobs only. Using (1) and solving for w jc , one obtains
1 2c µ . The parameters˜ 1c and˜ 2c are functions of the city-specific employment rate, as captured by 1c and 2c .
Equation (12) has the form of a reflection problem (Manski, 1993; Mo tt, 2001; Beaudry et al., 2012) in which job-city-specific wages are determined by some fraction of the value of the marginal product of labour and by a weighted average of wages in alternate jobs. This weighted average derives from the discounted utility of unemployment and reflects workers' outside options.
On top of di↵erences in the marginal product of labour, this equation highlights two sources of wage disparities: di↵erences in the local structure of employment (⌘ kc ), and di↵erences in jobspecific skill transferability ( kc|j ), as captured by the transition probability ( kc|j ). The first implies spatial variation in wages; cities whose employment is skewed towards high-paying jobs tend to pay higher wages in all jobs since a larger proportion of good jobs translates into better outside options. The second source results in industrial and occupational wage di↵erentials; jobs whose skill transferability is skewed towards high-paying jobs will pay higher wages as easier access to good jobs translates into better outside options.
It is worth noting that the coe cient˜ 2c only captures the first-round e↵ect of a one-unit shift in workers' outside options. Imagine that a secretary can switch to a legal assistant job and that a legal assistant can become a lawyer, but that a secretary cannot directly become a lawyer. Further suppose that, everything else being equal, the wage for lawyers goes up and translates into a oneunit increase in the outside options of legal assistants. Equation (12) indicates that legal assistants' wages would first increase by˜ 2c . Due to the feedback dynamics inherent to the wage equation, this first-round e↵ect modifies the outside options of workers who can directly switch to legal assistant jobs, therefore generating additional rounds of wage adjustment. The way feedback dynamics multiply themselves out depends on workers' mobility; for instance, in the case of secretaries who can only switch to legal assistant jobs, lawyers' wages enter the wage determination of secretaries only indirectly, as second-round impacts and beyond, through changes in legal assistants' wages.
Most of the paper is devoted to the identification of the partial impacts of a shift in workers' outside options. In Section 6, the paper derives an expression for the total impacts.
Towards identifying independent search and bargaining e↵ects
Identifying independent search and bargaining e↵ects appears di cult mainly because the value of the marginal product of labour is both unobserved and correlated with workers' outside options.
To give a sense of why identification may still be possible, it is useful to start with a quite extreme example. 6 Consider an environment with two labour markets (cities A and B), two industries (natural resources and manufacturing) and two occupations (white and blue collar workers). The natural resources industry is located in city A and employs blue collar workers only. Assume that the price of natural resources goes up and that following this increase, wages of blue collar workers increase in both the natural resources sector and the manufacturing industry in city A, but that no other wage or employment changes are observed whatsoever.
Could the increase in wages of blue collar workers in the manufacturing industry in city A reflect an increase in the value of the marginal product? In this particular environment, it is hard to present any pathway in which the value of the marginal product would go up for blue collar workers in the manufacturing sector in city A but not for white collar workers. For instance, if the shock to natural resources had caused a shift in productivity in the manufacturing sector (perhaps because natural resources are used as inputs in the production of manufactured goods), one would have expected wages of both white and blue collar workers to increase in both cities.
Therefore, given that no labour movements are observed anywhere and that wages for white collar workers do not change, one is led to conclude that the increase in wages of blue collar workers in the manufacturing industry in city A reflects independent e↵ects of an improvement in workers' outside options and not a shift in labour demand in the manufacturing industry.
Although this example is extreme, this logic of comparing changes in wages "within an industrycity" and "across cities" can be extended to the case in which one observes some labour movements.
Imagine for instance that, following the increase in the price of natural resources, blue collar workers in city A reallocate from the manufacturing industry to the natural resources sector. In this case, the increase in wages of blue collar workers in the manufacturing industry in city A cannot be entirely attributed to search and bargaining e↵ects because the reallocation towards the natural resources sector modifies the industrial composition in city A, which in turn a↵ects the weights used to calculate the outside options of blue collar workers. However, independent e↵ects of workers' outside options can still be identified as long as one uses an instrumental variable strategy to isolate changes in blue collar workers' outside options that are uncorrelated with labour movements in city A. One possible strategy would consist in using a Bartik-style instrument, i.e. in predicting changes in workers' outside options using industrial employment growth at the national level. The observed changes in wages of blue collar workers in the manufacturing sector in city A could then be attributed to changes in their predicted outside options.
In subsection 3.1, the paper formalises this example and adopts a quite general formulation of technology to show how observational data can be used to identify independent e↵ects of workers' outside options. The subsection then discusses the empirical implications of imposing more restrictive assumptions on the production function. Subsection 3.2 presents instruments that deal with both the feedback dynamics of wages and the endogeneity of the transition probabilities.
Placing restrictions on the production function
In what follows, the paper uses an occupation-industry notation whenever necessary for clarity and uses the subscript qi to denote the job that refers to occupation q and industry i. Using this notation, equation (12) rewrites
where w qic is the wage in job qi and city c, V MP L qic is the value of the marginal product of labour in job qi and city c and kc|qi is the transition probability from job qi to job k in city c.
The production function in industry i and city c takes the following form
where ✓ qic is a productive term associated to job qi in city c, N qic is employment in job qi and city c, and where F ic (·) is of the CES form. Note that all the components of the production function are allowed to vary over time. For clarity, the time subscript is omitted until necessary.
The productive term ✓ qic has both a national job-specific e↵ect and a local job-specific e↵ect; in particular, ✓ qic = ✓ qi + " qic , where " qic is a source of comparative advantage of city c for job qi, and where by definition P c " qic = 0. A key assumption for the identification strategy is that, while there is no restriction on the national component ✓ qi , the local job-specific e↵ect " qic is well approximated by a random walk.
This formulation of technology assumes that a job is associated with a specific set of skills and entirely characterises a worker's type, which means that in a particular job-city cell, workers with the same set of individual characteristics (e.g. age, nationality, gender, education) all share the same productivity. Subsection 5.3 explores the limitations of such an assumption by allowing productive terms to depend upon previous job.
The marginal product of labour in job qi and city c that follows from (14) can be written as
where
is an industry-city-specific aggregate that depends on the composition of employment in industry i and city c, g qic (✓ qic ) is a component that depends on the job-city-specific productive term and where h qic (N qic ) is a function of job-city-specific employment.
If, for instance, the production function in industry i and city c is a CES of the form
where  1, then the components of the marginal product of labour for qi are
given by
qic . In the limiting case where factors are perfect substitutes (i.e. when = 1), the marginal product of labour is constant and given by
In order to make the relationship between job-city wages, a city's employment rate and the components of the value of the marginal product explicit, the paper performs a first-order log linear approximation of equation (13). The log linear approximation is taken around the point where cities have identical employment rates (ER c = ER) and where employment is uniformly distributed across jobs (⌘ qic = 1 QI ), which occurs when both the value of the marginal product of labour and mobility costs are constant across jobs and cities (i.e. V MP L qic = V MP L and ' k|qi = ', where k is the destination job). Derivation details can be found in Appendix B of the Supplementary Material. Expressing the wage equation as the first di↵erence between two steady state equilibria, one obtains
where denotes the time di↵erence, ⌧ is the time subscript and ⇠ qic⌧ =˜ 1 ↵ 3 " qic⌧ . Note that to reduce measurement errors, the paper averages annual data over five years, taking mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive intervals. It is important to note that in this framework, whichever restrictions are placed on the production function, " qic⌧ , the unobserved local job-specific component of the productive factor, will always be part of the error term. In what follows, the paper examines whether˜ 2 can actually be identified, assuming first that any endogeneity issue resulting from the correlation between measured workers' outside options and the unobservable term ⇠ qic⌧ can appropriately be tackled with an instrumental variable strategy. The instruments are discussed in the next subsection.
Equation (16) suggests that the proper approach for the identification of˜ 2 depends on three factors: (1) whether industrial prices include a local component, (2) the specific restrictions placed on technology and (3) how mobile workers are across jobs. The last dimension determines how wages o↵ered in alternate jobs enter the wage determination process and whether workers' outside options are better represented using transition probabilities or employment shares to weigh wages in alternate jobs. When workers are identically mobile across jobs, then kc⌧ |qi = 1 and the measure of workers' outside options becomes P k2S ⌘ kc⌧ w kc⌧ , the city-specific average wage. Whether workers' outside options are job-city-specific or city-specific is critical for the identification strategy because it a↵ects the type of variation that can be used in the data to identify˜ 2 .
When workers face heterogeneous mobility costs, "within job across cities" and "within industrycity across jobs" data variation can be used, making identification possible with practically any price and technology encompassed by specification (14). Consider the case in which the production function in industry i and city c is a CES with  1. Then, the e↵ect of f ic⌧ can be captured by an entire set of industry-city-specific time-varying dummies and the impact of ✓ qi⌧ can be controlled for using job-specific time-varying dummies. In such a case, the parameter of interest is identified by estimating
where d denotes a set of dummy variables. With this production function, whether industrial prices include a local component or not is irrelevant as price e↵ects will be absorbed by d ic⌧ . It is worth noting that, since d ic⌧ also captures city-time e↵ects, equation (17) no longer has the term ER c⌧ in an explicit form. The inclusion of both job-specific and industry-city-specific time-varying dummies implies a triple di↵erence estimation to correct wage movements for changes in the marginal product of labour. For example, in a framework with two occupations, two industries and two cities, this is equivalent to the following: taking the di↵erence between periodical changes in wages for blue collar workers in the manufacturing sector in city A and the equivalent wage variation for white collars, then calculating the di↵erence between that change and its counterpart in city B, and finally estimating the importance of workers' outside options in explaining the residual wage variation.
The first di↵erence (within city, across jobs, as captured by d ic⌧ ) also removes any local and local industry-specific factors that the model does not capture but that may interfere with inferences.
These factors include e↵ects associated with changes in city-specific employment rate, house prices, non-tradable goods across cites, input-output linkages, local demand, the German Confederation of Trade Unions, and other local forces that may contribute to the growth of cities such as, for instance, education externalities (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Moretti, 2004) , employment diversity, agglomeration e↵ects or local house prices e↵ects (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Glaeser et al., 1992; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Moretti, 2011) . The second di↵erence (within job across cities) purges job-city-specific periodical di↵erences in wages from national-level movements in occupation and industry factors.
In the limiting case where factors are perfect substitutes, equation (16) becomes
and whether one should include industry-city-time dummies on top of job-time dummies depends on the assumption placed on industrial prices. If industrial prices are invariant across cities, theñ 2 is identified by estimating
or, controlling for a wider range of local time-varying factors,
where d c⌧ denotes a city time-varying set of dummies.
When mobility costs are constant across jobs, the identifying variation can only come from "within job across cities" data variation as any set of city time-varying or industry-city timevarying dummies would be colinear to measured outside options. In other words, when mobility costs are constant, wage disparities generated from search and bargaining mechanisms stem from local di↵erences only and can, by construction, hardly be distinguished from those resulting from standard general equilibrium local forces. For this reason, identification is only possible if the marginal product of labour is constant and if prices vary across industries only. This particular case would lead to the estimation of the following wage equation
Within the set of technologies encompassed by (14), all other cases produce a biased estimate of 2 .
The most recent approach to identifying search and bargaining mechanisms has been suggested by Beaudry et al. (2012) and corresponds to the special case for which technology has perfectly substitutable factors and workers' mobility is homogeneous across any pair of jobs. Thus, without extending the analysis to a more general framework, it is unclear whether Beaudry et al. (2012) 's empirical strategy confounds the e↵ects of changes in outside options with those resulting from changes in the value of marginal productivity.
The following figure summarizes the conditions under which the parameter˜ 2 can be identified.
As Figure 1 indicates, controlling for more flexible formulations of the value of the marginal product of labour is impossible when di↵erences in mobility across jobs are unimportant for measuring outside options. Therefore, when presenting results, this paper starts from the most restrictive case, showing first that those mobility di↵erences matter for wage formation, and then moves towards the most general case. 
The endogeneity of the outside options of workers
This subsection discusses how the paper deals with the endogeneity issue that results from the feedback dynamics of wages and from the correlation between both the transition probabilities and the unobservable job-city-specific time-varying component " qic⌧ , left in the error term. The treatment of this issue is completely symmetric to that of Beaudry et al. (2012) . 8
Job creation and transition probabilities
To clarify the link between the transition probabilities and the error term, it is useful to first set up the equation that determines the number of positions that are created in a particular job and city. The time subscript is omitted where possible henceforth. Job creation is determined by a free entry condition whereby individuals with expected payo↵s larger than the fixed entry cost K become entrepreneurs. Thus, the total number of positions that are created in job qi and city c is given by
where J qic (n) denotes the number of positions in job qi, city c and firm with managerial ability n and where the cuto↵ n ⇤ ic satisfies (22), the transition probability from job qi to job q 0 i 0 in city c can be written as
where r indexes an occupation and s is an industry subscript. Taking a linear approximation around the point where cities have identical employment rates and a similar employment structure, the transition probability can be rewritten as a function of current "s and ⌦s, the sources of comparative advantage of city c. That is,
where ⌦ c = P I s=1 ⌦ sc , " c = P Q r=1 P I s=1 " rsc and ⇡ 1 -⇡ 3 are positive terms obtained from the linear approximation. The first three components are associated with the job-city-specific employment share ⌘ q 0 i 0 c . The last component reflects workers' skill transferability from job qi to q 0 i 0 . Since the last term is measured at the national level, any correlation between the transition probabilities and the error term stems from the employment shares components, and more specifically, from the fact that these employment shares depend on current comparative advantages.
Instruments
The endogeneity issue is tackled with Bartik-style instruments. The latter are constructed using a decomposition of the following term
whereˆdenotes a prediction,ˆ kc⌧ |qi =ˆ kc⌧ |qi⌘kc⌧ and ⌫ k⌧ is the nation-wide wage premium in job k relative to some numeraire job. This measure reflects predicted workers' outside options and weights each national job wage premium with the corresponding predicted job-city-specific transition probability. The termsˆ kc⌧ |qi and⌘ kc⌧ are constructed using predicted employment, i.e.
the level of employment that would be observed if start-of-period employment had grown according to the national trend. Specifically, predicted employment in job k, city c and time ⌧ is computed
Since the main identifying variation is across cities and national wage premia do not vary across cities, one only needs to be concerned about the condition under which predicted employment shares are uncorrelated with the error term. This condition is met if the term " qic⌧ (left in the error term) follows a random walk or, in other terms, if shocks to " qic⌧ are uncorrelated with the sources of start-of-period job-city-specific comparative advantages. This can be seen by noting that an expression similar to (24) can be derived for predicted transition probabilities, where instead of being functions of current components,ˆ kc⌧ |qi depends on past sources of comparative advantages.
The paper proposes two sets of instruments, constructed by decomposing (25) into four elements, each of them isolating a di↵erent type of data variation but valid under the exact same identifying assumption. These two sets of instruments are particularly useful for testing overidentifying restrictions. The decomposition uses the fact that, for example, the option of working as a 9 The paper uses N kc(⌧ 1) = 1 5 P t+4 t N kct , t 2 (⌧ 1) as start-of-period employment, which is akin to using the fifth lag to predict actual local employment. The choice of the base year from which the growth rate is computed trades o↵ exogeneity against its potential to be a good predictor for employment.
secretary in the car industry for a secretary in the tertiary sector in city A may change over time, either because of shifts in the wage o↵ered to secretaries in the car industry in city A or because of changes in the probability of being hired there (as captured by the transition probability). Based on this idea, one can break equation (25) down into the following instruments. The first one,
isolates variations in workers' outside options that are due to changes in wage premia. The second instrument,
identifies changes stemming from shifts in transition probabilities. Since the probability of finding a particular job hinges on both vacancies (as captured by employment shares) and mobility costs, IV 2qic⌧ can be split into two further elements,
which is associated with changes in employment shares, and
which is based on changes in measures reflecting relative mobility. If the variation stemming from di↵erences in sectoral and occupational mobility matters for wage formation, the first stage estimates on IV 2qic⌧ and IV 4qic⌧ should enter in a positive, similar and statistically significant manner. The first set of instruments will include IV 1qic⌧ and IV 2qic⌧ , the second set comprises IV 1qic⌧ , IV 3qic⌧ and IV 4qic⌧ . When workers are identically mobile across occupations and industries (i.e. when ' k|qi = '), changes in workers' outside options can only stem from changes in wages or shifts in employment shares. In such a case, the set of available instruments reduces to IV 1c⌧ = P all earnings subject to statutory social security contributions and reported at least once annually.
The wage measure corresponds to daily wages. The reporting of income is truncated from above and from below. The upper limit is the contribution assessment ceiling for social insurance, which 10 The major reforms that took place were the 1996 labour Law Act for Promotion of Employment, the 1998 Minimum Wage for Construction Workers, and the Hartz Reforms between 2003 and 2005.
11 The term "factually anonymous" means that personal information has been "depersonalised", i.e. that "information concerning personal or material circumstances can no longer or only with a disproportionate amount of time, expense and labour be attributed to an identified or identifiable individual" (section 3 [7] of the Federal Data Protection Act).
is adapted annually to the growth of nominal wages, and the lower limit is the minimum wage. 12
The Scientific Use File provides a 2% anonymous sample of the original IAB employment database.
Over the entire sample period, a 2% representative sample is drawn from four clusters, namely 
Wages adjusted for workers' characteristics
The main results are based on a common two-stage approach, which allows for individual observable characteristics to be controlled for. The second stage estimates the relationship of interest. The first stage consists of purging individual wages from components which are associated with age, gender, nationality or education, using a series of Mincer-type regressions.
For each year, log individual wages are regressed on a vector of individual characteristics and a complete set of occupation-industry-city interaction terms. Individual wages are expressed in euros and converted into real wages using the consumer price index, base 2005, provided by the German federal statistical o ce. The vector of individual characteristics includes age, the square of age, a gender dummy, a nationality dummy, a categorical variable for education and a full set of educationgender, education-nationality and education-age interactions. 14 In performing yearly regressions, returns to skill are allowed to vary over time. The dependent variable w qic⌧ is constructed using five-year averages of the coe cients on the job-city dummies. As for the wage premia, the same approach is used: log individual wages are regressed on the same vector of individual characteristics and a complete set of job dummies. The coe cients on the dummies are used to compute ⌫ qi⌧ , the job wage premia. The square root of the number of observations in each job-city cell is used to create weights for the second stage estimation.
Skill transferability measure
As shown by Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010) , moves across similar jobs are more likely to be observed than distant switches. Accordingly, this paper proxies skill transferability using observed occupation-industry-specific transitions. In order to obtain a representative number of individuals moving across cells, the data are pooled over the entire period to construct
where N k|qi denote the total number of individuals switching from job qi to k from one year to the next. Table 2 shows that manufacturing workers are more likley to move to jobs related to travel and transport, whereas the probability of them moving to, say, arts, creative and recreational occupations is less than 1%. Administration-and bureaucracy-related occupations are the most probable destinations for technicians, services and professionals workers. 
Results
To make this study comparable with that of Beaudry et al. (2012) , this paper first examines the importance of the treatment of mobility across occupations and industries using the most restrictive formulation of prices and technology. As it turns out, it appears that the heterogeneity in workers' mobility across jobs is an important dimension for identification. The paper then exploits the variation created by di↵erences in job-specific skill transferability to show that as one controls for sequentially more and more flexible specifications of the production function, the importance of workers' outside options does not decrease.
Homogeneous versus heterogeneous skill transferability
To evaluate the importance of job-specific skill transferability in wage formation, this section compares the estimates obtained by estimating specifications (19) and (21) -cases 4 and 8 of Figure   1 , respectively.
In addition to the endogeneity issue associated with workers' outside options, estimating (19) and (21) also requires dealing with the endogeneity of local employment rates. The traditional approach to dealing with the endogeneity of the employment rate is to construct the so-called Bartik instrument, used in various studies (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Beaudry et al., 2012) . Exploiting the disaggregation at the occupational level, the Bartik instrument is given by
Since (32) is based on past employment shares and predicted current employment, the identifying assumption is identical to that required to ensure the validity of the instruments for workers' outside options.
By predicting local employment growth solely, the Bartik instrument focuses on the numerator of the employment rate and neglects changes driven by shifts in the labour force. Since West
Germany experienced important variations in its population (especially following the immigration wave that occured after the fall of the Iron Curtain), the Bartik instrument may perform poorly if used on its own to predict the employment rate. Presumably, limited information on unemployed workers prevented US studies from creating the labour force counterpart of the Bartik instrument.
German data, however, allow individuals to be traced over time and therefore unemployed workers to be a liated to a particular occupation and industry. This paper takes advantage of this source of information to create a second instrument, Bartik 2c⌧ , which replaces employment in equation (32) by its corresponding labour force counterpart.
Results are shown in Table 3 . Standard errors are clustered at the level of the city, thus allowing the error terms to be heteroscedastic and correlated within city. 15 Each of the specifications includes a full set of time-varying occupation-industry dummies to control for changes in industry and occupation aggregates, including changes in national occupation-industry wage premia and industry-wide bargaining. Thus, the estimates rely on a comparison of periodical di↵erences in wages within occupation-industry cells across cities. In a 2x2x2 framework, this would mean comparing periodical changes in wages for secretaries in the car industry in city A with those in city B
and testing the importance of workers' outside options in explaining the residual wage variation. Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Columns (1) and (2) show results for specification (21), which assumes homogeneous job-specific skill transferability. In both columns, estimates are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. As expected, the OLS estimate is biased upwards. The IV coe cient indicates that a 1% increase in the city average wage generates a 0.415% positive spillover e↵ect on wages. This first set of results is in line with Beaudry et al. (2012) .
Results associated with specification (19) are shown in columns (3) to (5). The estimate obtained with OLS is large at 0.363 and statistically significant at the 1% level. Unlike previous results, the direction of the bias is a priori ambiguous. On one hand, the reflection problem and the endogeneity of employment likely create an upward bias. On the other hand, the transition probabilities are measured with errors, pulling down the OLS estimate. Column (4) shows the results obtained when using the first set of instruments, which decompose changes in predicted outside options into wage premia variations and shifts in the transition probabilities. Column (5) is based on the second set of instruments, which further isolates movements in the local composition of employment (shifts in ⌘ kc⌧ ) and changes in the relative mobility measure. Whichever IV specification one looks at, the estimates are similar -0.644 in column (4) and at 0.603 in column (5) -and statistically significant at the 1% level.
The two sets of instruments o↵er a test of overidentifying restrictions. Since each instrument explores a distinct type of data variation, any deviation from the identifying assumption would be weighted di↵erently and, therefore, produce di↵erent estimates. For this reason, the similarity of the results obtained in columns (4) and (5) can be interpreted as evidence that shocks to comparative advantages are uncorrelated with past job-city-specific comparative advantages. The Hansen test statistics at the bottom of the table gives support to this argument.
The second section of Table 3 shows the first stage. Each of the IV 's estimates is statistically significant at the 1% level and a↵ects workers' outside options in a similar fashion, indicating that wages, employment shares and skill transferability are important determinants of workers' outside options. Importantly, the fact that the estimates on IV 2qic⌧ and IV 4qic⌧ are statistically significant provides support to the mechanism put forward in this paper that di↵erences in job-specific skill transferability also enter workers' wage-bargaining process. The IV's corresponding F-statistics of the excluded instruments is above 10, confirming that the relevance condition is satisfied. For each endogenous regressor, the Angrist-Pischke p-value is zero, indicating the absence of a weak instrumental variables problem. As for the employment rate, the Bartik instruments enter the first stage in a statistically significant manner. Not surprisingly, the labour force counterpart of the original Bartik measure is negative.
So far, results suggest that di↵erences in job-specific skill transferability matter for wage formation. However, since the estimates obtained across the di↵erent specifications do not statistically di↵er from each other, it may be the case that relaxing the homogeneity assumption only adds unnecessary complications or noise to the analysis. Columns (6) to (8) evaluate this possibility and introduce both measures of workers' outside options, P k2S ⌘ kc w kc and P k2S\{qi} kc|qi ⌘ kc w kc , in one single specification. Once the endogeneity of workers' outside options is accounted for, the estimate on the city average wage becomes negative and statistically insignificant while the estimate on the other measure remains unaltered. A di↵erent picture would have emerged if di↵erences in jobspecific skill transferability had little value-added, or were simply adding noise to the estimation.
Isolating search and bargaining mechanisms
An important condition for the identification strategy is that the variation used to identify the e↵ects of outside options is not very correlated with labour movements across industries and occupations within a city. Thus, this subsection starts by explicitly reporting the correlation patterns between the instruments and periodical changes in the log of job-city employment within a labour market. Table 4 shows that none of the instruments a↵ects changes in log job-city employment in a statistically significant manner, making it even harder to argue that the IV estimates could be biased due to a correlation between the instruments and changes in the marginal product of labour. Table 5 exploits the fact that di↵erences in job-specific skill transferability generate job-city-specific outside options to sequentially controls for more flexible formulations of the value of the marginal product of labour (thus moving up from case 4 to 1 in Figure 1 ).
The first three columns correspond to specification (20) which adds an entire set city-time dummies to the most restrictive formulation of prices and technology. Thus, relative to columns (3)-(5) of Table 3 , specification (20) takes an additional di↵erence that compares periodical changes in, say, secretaries' wages in the tertiary sector to those changes in any other occupation and industry within city A. In doing so, local time-varying factors are removed from the wage equation and the residual variation is attributed to the di↵erences in workers' outside options that stem from job-specific skill transferability.
Columns (4)- (6) add industry-city-time dummies (therefore controlling for local industry-specific e↵ects) and show estimates consistent with a specification that allows industrial prices to vary across cities, while maintaining the assumption of perfectly substitutable factors. Relative to the previous columns, the triple di↵erence estimation focuses on periodical changes in wages across occupations in the same industry and city, which means for instance comparing wage di↵erentials for secretaries to those for engineers within the tertiary sector of city A. Such a comparison relies on the premise that there exist su cient di↵erences between the mobility of secretaries and engineers (i.e.
kC|ST 6 = kC|ET ). Columns (7)- (9) introduce the change in log job local employment to specification (20) . To deal with the endogeneity of this variable, this paper uses a Bartik-style instrument, constructed in a way similar to the instruments used for workers' outside options and valid under identical conditions.
In particular, the instrument is given by the change in the log of job local predicted employment, computed as in equation (26), i.e. by multiplying the initial level of job-city employment with the corresponding national-level growth of job employment.
Finally, estimates consistent with the most flexible formulation of technology, such as a CES production function with  1, are shown in columns (10)- (12), where both industry-city-time dummies and changes in log job-city employment are controlled for. In such a case, the assumption imposed on industrial prices is irrelevant as any local component will be captured by d ic⌧ . Table 5 indicates that the restrictions placed on technology and prices are not an important source of bias. Specifically, it appears that the instruments coupled with both occupation-industry-specific and city-specific time-varying dummies do a good job in isolating productivity from independent e↵ects of workers' outside options on
wages. In what follows, specification (20) is refered to as baseline specification. Retaining column (2), the estimate obtained suggests that a 10% increase in workers' outside options generates a 7%
wage increase, which is remarkable considering that this estimate only captures first-round wage impacts.
Allowing the productivity term to depend upon previous job
The production function Y ic assumes that in a particular job-city cell, workers with the same set of individual characteristics all share the same productivity. This assumption implies that, whichever restrictions are placed on technology, productive components do not depend on previous job and neither do values of the marginal product of labour. This section discusses the implications of relaxing this specific assumption and instead assuming that productive terms are of the form ✓ kc|qi , where qi indexes previous job. 17
A direct implication of relaxing this assumption is that the unit of analysis of the discounted values for firms and workers becomes a job in a city, conditional on previous job. This means that the indices in equations (3), (4), (6) and (7) are adjusted to reflect a worker's previous job. Although the form of these discounted values remain unaltered, the wage equation will have an additional component relfecting the fact that skills accumulated in the previous job can be transported to the next job and can therefore a↵ect productivity.
To see where this di↵erence is coming from it is useful to write down the discounted utility of being employed and unemployed in job k and city c, conditional on previously being employed in qi. Letting these terms be denoted by U e kc|qi and U u kc , respectively, one obtains,
where w kc|qi denotes the wage o↵ered in cell kc conditional on qi, and
Note that since it only depends on future potential employment opportunities, the utility of being unemployed only depends on where the person was employed prior to becoming unemployed.
Combining (33) and (34), one can express the utility of being unemployed as follows
where ⌫ k 0 c|k = w k 0 c|k w k 0 c . The term ⌫ k 0 c|k corresponds to the wage premium in job k 0 and city c paid to workers previously employed in job k, relative to the average wage paid in job k 0 and city c. The main di↵erence between this equation and the baseline framework is captured by the wage premia component P Equation (35) implies that outside options will also have to reflect the fact that workers in a job are compensated for any additional contribution above the average productivity in that particular job.
Solving for the Nash bargaining solution and averaging at the job-city level, one obtains the following wage equation
This equation suggests that di↵erences in wages within the same job-city cell are fully explained by di↵erences in the value of the marginal product of labour. One can obtain the equation of interest by averaging (36) within job k and c.
This wage equation suggests that if the assumption placed on productive terms in the baseline framework is too restrictive, the coe cient 2 estimated in Table 5 may su↵er from an upward bias. Ideally, one would want to estimate (36) at the job-city level using the traceablility of individuals in Germany to construct the premium component
k 0 c|k ⌫ k 0 c|k . However, with a 2% random sample of the population only, constructing a measure of ⌫ k 0 c|k that perfectly matches the predictions of the model is impossible. This is the case because, at a particular point in time, the number of individuals with similar observable characteristics per job-city cell, conditional on previous job would be insu cient. Nevertheless, the paper proposes to proxy the wage premium with ⌫ k 0 c|k = w k 0 |k w kc , where w k 0 |k is the counter-part of w k 0 c|k , computed at the national level.
While this is certainly not perfect, this approach does at least give sense of how large the bias may be. Instruments for P k 0 2S k 0 c|k ⌫ k 0 c|k are constructed in a way similar to that of the baseline measure of outside options.
Results are shown in Table 6 . The wage premia component does not appear to have any statistically significant impact on wage determination and more importantly, its inclusion does not alter the estimates on measured outside options. Thus, this table suggests that the restrictions placed on the productive term in the baseline framework is not an important source of bias. Overall, none of these changes alter the estimates on measured outside options in a way that would change the fundamental conclusions on this paper.
6 The total e↵ect of a shift in workers' outside options
Although the main objective of the paper is to estimate the coe cient˜ 2 , it is useful to derive an expression for the total e↵ect of a shift in workers' outside options. This expression is then used for two purposes: first, to perform a test of the validity of the model and second, to compute the fraction of the variance of the wage growth across cities that is due to the e↵ects of outside options.
Deriving the total e↵ect
In order to derive the total e↵ect of a shift in workers' outside options, the paper first uses (16) to set out equations for wages determined by productivity, the wages paid elsewhere in the local economy and city-specific employment rate. That is,
where W c is a QIx1 vector with a typical element being w qic ; ⇥ c is a QIx1 vector with typical
; c is a QIxQI matrix with typical element kc|qi , k and qi being the column and row indexes in the matrix; and ⌅ c is a QIx1 vector with a typical element being local employment rate. Solving (37) for the vector of wages, one obtains
18 Appendix K-4 discusses the top-coding issue a↵ecting individual wages in the IABS sample. Appendix K-5 proposes alternative measure of mobility. In Appendix K-6, the paper examines the e↵ect of interest di↵ers before and after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Appendix K-7 proposes to average the data over three and eight years, as an alternative to five years. In Appendix K-8, standard errors are clustered at the city-time, industry or industry-time level. Finally, Appendix K-9 investigates whether the baseline estimate di↵ers across industries and occupations.
where M is a QIxQI identify matrix and
The second step consists in writing the vector of productivities ⇥ c as a function of the vector of national wage premia. To achieve this goal, one first has to obtain an expression for the national wage premia. Let ⌫ qi denote the national wage premium in job qi, i.e. the nation-wide wage paid in job qi relative to the nation-wide wage paid in some numeraire job, say occupation-industry 11.
Using equation (13), the wage premium in job qi is given by
Taking a linear approximation in a way similar to that described earlier (i.e. around the point where cities have identical employment rates and where employment is uniformly distributed across jobs), one obtains
Equation (40) can be further simplified by rewriting the value of the marginal product of labour as a function of two components: a national job-specific and a local job-specific term. In particular,
where by definition
Using this rewrite, equation (40) reduces to
As in Beaudry et al. (2012) , job wage premia depend on industrial prices. However, since this paper relies on a more flexible production function, job wage premia also depend on the nationwide components of the marginal product of labour. Using equation (39), the vector of productivities can now be rewritten as a function of the vector of national wage premia, i.e.
where V is a QIx1 vector of national wage premia with typical element ⌫ qi ; $ c is a QIx1 vec-tor with typical element being
, the job-city specific components of the value of the marginal product of labour; and A is a QIx1 vector of constant terms.
Substituting equation (42) into (38), one obtains equations for wages determined by productivity, national wage premia and local employment rate. Specifically,
where ⌥ c =˜ 2 c [M ˜ 2 c ] 1 A. Since A is a vector of constant terms, the typical element of ⌥ is a job-specific term, independent of local components.
In equation (43), the relevant measure of workers' outside option is a weighted average of job national wage premia. Unlike equation (16), the weights combine the transition probabilities with the parameter˜ 2 itself, making direct estimation of this type of relationship infeasible. Nevertheless, the total e↵ect of a shift in workers' outside options can be computed by substituting˜ 2 with its estimated counterpart,ˆ 2 . Specifically, the total e↵ect of a shift in workers' outside option can be measured asˆ
where denote a time first di↵erence.
Model testing
The previous subsection suggests that if the model is sound, estimating the wage equation using ⇣ that does not statistically di↵er from the baseline estimate. Table 7 shows the results obtained when taking 0.55, 0.6 and 0.65 as reference parameters. 19 For all columns, the estimates are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The size of the IV s coe cients is close to that estimated in the baseline, suggesting that the model proposed in this paper provides a good approximation 19 Repeating this exercise for parameter values over the range 0.55 to 0.65, the paper finds that usingˆ 2 = 0.6235 as the reference parameter to create the new measure of workers' outside options yields an estimate of˜ 2 of 0.6235. of the wage determination process. Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the city level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Variance decomposition
The objective of this subsection is to quantify the importance of changes in workers' outside options in explaining the cross-sectional variance in city wage growth. To achieve this goal, the paper focuses on changes induced by shifts in the composition of job local employment and compares the fraction of the variance that is explained by changes in outside options to the fraction of the variance that would be explained in the absence of search and bargaining e↵ects. In addition, to evaluate the role of the treatment of mobility in measuring outside options, the paper distinguishes between a framework with constant mobility and a model with heterogeneous job-specific skill transferability.
If wages are determined by productivity only, then changes in the industrial and occupational structure of employment have no e↵ect on wage formation. In such a case, the total e↵ect on cross-sectional variance reflects employment composition changes only and can be measured by the following ratio of variances i ,
where the denominator corresponds to the variance of city wage growth over two periods.
In the presence of search and bargaining e↵ects, employment composition-induced changes in outside options modify job-city wages and generate an additional indirect e↵ect on city wage growth.
As a result, the nominator in (45) is augmented by an additional term capturing the total e↵ect of changes in outside options on job-city wages. In a framework where job-skill transferability is irrelevant for wage formation, the variance ratio is computed as
If, instead, di↵erences in workers' mobility matter, the variance ratio can be measured with 
These ratios are reported in column (1)-(3) of Table 8 . The first column corresponds to (45), the second one to (46) and the last one to (47). The results indicate that the predicted direct e↵ect of changes in the composition of job local employment ranges from 4% to 20% in a model where wages are determined by productivity only. Columns (2) and (3) suggest a framework that accounts for search and bargaining e↵ects always explains a much larger fraction of the cross-sectional variance in city wage movements. This fraction ranges from 6% to 36% in the case of constant mobility and from 33% to more than 100% in the case where mobility di↵ers across any two pairs of jobs.
The results of columns (2) and (3) also indicate that the treatment of mobility plays an crucial role in determining the fraction of the variance that can be explained by changes the within-city composition of employment. Interestingly, these results are consistent with the finding of Card et al. (2013) according to which a considerable fraction of the increase in wage inequality is due to rising dispersion in the wage premia that are o↵ered by di↵erent employers. In this paper, search and bargaining mechanisms create wage disparities across employers for workers with otherwise similar characteristics and imply that the rise in workplace heterogeneity may have been caused by an increase in the variance of workers' outside options. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 show an increase in the variance ratio over time and therefore seem to support this idea.
Concluding remarks
This paper empirically demonstrates that workers' outside options are important determinants of wages. The paper proposes novel strategies to identify changes in workers' outside options that are independent of changes in the marginal product of labour, the main challenge of estimating search and bargaining e↵ects. To do so, the paper adapts a multi-city multi-sector model of search and bargaining to allow for multiple occupations and for di↵erences in job-specific skill transferability.
It then shows how di↵erences in job-specific skill transferability can be used as a source of variation for identification. The main result is that a 10% increase in workers' outside options generates a 7% wage increase. This estimate is remarkably robust to a various range of sensitivity checks, which
indicates that search and bargaining mechanisms play a substantial role in wage determination.
